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The Council of Europe is the continent’s leading 
human rights organisation. It comprises 47 member 
states, 28 of which are members of the European 
Union. All Council of Europe member states have 
signed up to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, a treaty designed to protect human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. The European Court 
of Human Rights oversees the implementation 
of the Convention in the member states.
For refugees, the right to family reunification is crucial because 
separation from their family members causes significant anxiety 
and is widely recognised as a barrier to successful integration in host 
countries. Well-designed family reunification policies also help create 
the safe and legal routes that are necessary to prevent dangerous, 
irregular journeys to and within Europe. 
Despite the importance of facilitating family reunification for both 
refugees and European states, the trend is now towards imposing 
greater restrictions in this area. This paper assesses restrictions on 
the right to family reunification, as enshrined in United Nations 
human rights treaties, the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and European Union law, and shows that many of the legal 
and practical restrictions currently in place raise concerns from a 
human rights perspective.
Based on this analysis, the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights sets out a number of recommendations to member 
states intended to assist national authorities in re-examining their 
laws, policies and practices in order to give full effect to the right to 
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“How can I eat, how can I sleep when my 
daughter has no food and cannot sleep because 
she dreams she will be taken by Daesh”1
Refugee in Ireland waiting for family reunification
Summary
T his issue paper examines family reunification for refugees as a pressing human rights issue. Without it, refugees are denied their right to respect for family life, have vastly diminished integration prospects and endure great additional 
unnecessary suffering, as do their family members. The Commissioner for Human 
Rights calls on all Council of Europe member states to uphold their human rights 
obligations and ensure the practical effectiveness of the right to family reunifica-
tion for refugees and other international protection beneficiaries. To do so, states 
should (re-)examine their laws, policies and practices relating to family reunifica-
tion for refugees. This issue paper contains 36 recommendations to that end.
Chapter 1 introduces the importance of this issue from a human rights and refugee 
integration perspective, noting that for refugees in particular, the right to family life 
normally requires swift reunification of families. Otherwise family members may be 
left in peril and the refugee’s capacity to integrate is completely undermined. This 
chapter also explains the meaning of key terms – “refugee”, “family” and “family reuni-
fication”. “Refugee” in the issue paper is understood broadly, encompassing refugees 
under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Convention 
refugees”) and other beneficiaries of international protection, who are not return-
able due to conflict or other serious human rights risks (who are often “subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries” in EU and some national laws). The term also encompasses 
asylum seekers, who, until their claims are processed, are presumptive refugees. The 
concept of “family” in this context is of necessity a broad one, and includes both the 
“immediate family” (spouse or partner, with minor children and other dependent 
children) and the “extended family”, which includes other dependent family members. 
“Family reunification” refers broadly to processes whereby refugees are enabled to 
have their family members join them in the country of asylum.
Chapter 2 sets out the pertinent international human rights standards applicable 
in Europe under various global instruments, examining in turn the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC), international refugee law and the revised European Social Charter 
(the Charter). The CRC provisions in particular create a strong entitlement to family 
reunification for children, with states being obliged to treat applications “in a positive, 
humane and expeditious manner”. The principles underlying these international 
instruments also support a strong right to family reunification for refugees.
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Chapter 3 contains an overview of the major case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (the Court) on this topic. The Court has an extensive case law under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) where it 
seeks to strike a fair balance between states’ migration control prerogatives and 
the right to respect for family life of migrants. It is demonstrated that in the case of 
refugees, vindicating the right to respect for family life means affording swift family 
reunification. This chapter also clarifies the implications of the “best interests of the 
child principle” as incorporated into the Court’s analysis. It also demonstrates that 
Article 14 of the Convention (non-discrimination) prohibits status discrimination, 
requiring strong justification for differences in treatment between 1951 Convention 
refugees, subsidiary and other protection beneficiaries as regards family reunifica-
tion. This chapter finds that justification to be lacking.
Chapter 4 provides a brief account of the key issues pertaining to EU law on family 
reunification for refugees, in order to rectify some common misperceptions that 
seem to inform the restrictive practices of EU member states. The main EU legisla-
tive measure, the Family Reunification Directive (FRD), requires member states to 
apply some favourable rules to 1951 Convention refugees, when compared to other 
third-country national migrants. However, its application to subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries is contested. This chapter assesses the legal framework and notes the 
legal requirement to justify any exclusions or restrictions of family reunification, also 
as a matter of EU law. It is also noted that family unity is privileged under the Dublin 
Regulation. However, in practice that instrument is not effective in guaranteeing 
family unity and often leads to protracted and unjustified family separation.
Chapter 5 examines the restrictive practice in some Council of Europe states, which 
puts the human rights of refugees and their children at risk. Partly in response to the 
rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015, several 
European states restricted family reunification. Common restrictions include limita-
tions on who may apply for family reunification, in particular limitations on the rights 
of subsidiary protection beneficiaries. There are also significant limitations on the 
recognised conception of “family”, which does not reflect the actual experience of 
refugees. Even when refugees formally enjoy a right to seek family reunification, a 
range of legal and practical barriers often render that right ineffective in practice. 
These barriers include waiting times, short deadlines, strict evidential requirements, 
financial cost barriers and barriers in the region of origin. Some human rights concerns 
when dependent legal status is accorded to family members are also identified here.
The concluding observations summarise the Commissioner’s recommendations to 
Council of Europe member states, placing particular emphasis on those concerning 
the practical effectiveness of the right to family reunification for refugees. It highlights 
the restrictions that were introduced as knee-jerk reactions to the refugee arrivals of 
2015, and the importance of abolishing them in order to ensure refugees’ integration 
and the effective protection of their families.
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The Commissioner’s 
recommendations
Ensure that family reunification procedures for all refugees (broadly under-
stood) are flexible, prompt and effective
1.  Give effect to the Court’s case law and ensure that all refugee family reunification 
procedures are flexible, prompt and effective, in order to ensure protection for 
the right to respect for their family life.
2.  Urgently review and revise relevant state policies if they discriminate between 
1951 Convention refugees, subsidiary and other protection beneficiaries.
Ensure that the definition of family members eligible for reunification is appro-
priately broad
3.  Accord family reunification rights to all spouses, where the term spouse is 
understood broadly to encompass not only legally recognised spouses and 
civil partners (including same-sex spouses and civil partners), but also individ-
uals who are engaged to be married, who have entered a customary marriage 
(also known as “common-law” marriage) or who have established long-term 
partnerships (including same-sex partners).
4.  Abolish age limits for spousal family reunification that are higher than the age 
of majority of 18 years.
Strengthen the position of children in the family reunification process
5.  Ensure that the best interests of the child is a primary consideration in all 
family reunification decisions and that refugee children’s requests for family 
reunification are dealt with in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.
6.  Avoid family separation and allow both parents and siblings to reunite when an 
unaccompanied minor is the sponsor, that is, the first family member arriving 
in a host state.
7.  Ensure that, for the purposes of applying for family reunification, a child is 
regarded as such as long as the application is submitted before he or she turns 
18. Applications brought by children should not be terminated when the child 
turns 18 and should recognise the particular protection needs of young adults 
who have fled as unaccompanied minors.
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Establish clear limits on age assessment processes
8.  Carry out age assessments only if there are reasonable doubts about a person 
being a minor. If doubts remain that the person may be underage, he or she 
should be granted the benefit of the doubt. Assessment decisions should be 
subject to administrative or judicial appeal.
9.  Age assessments based on medical evidence alone have proven to be ethically 
dubious and inadequate for determining a person’s actual age. Age assessments 
should rather involve a multidisciplinary evaluation by an independent authority 
over a period of time and not be based exclusively on medical assessment.
10.  Where there is a medical component to a multidisciplinary age assessment, 
examinations should only be carried out with the consent of the child or his or 
her guardian. Examinations should not be intrusive and should comply with 
medical and other pertinent ethical standards. The margin of error of medical 
and other examinations should be clearly indicated and taken into account.
Ensure that family reunification is granted to extended family members, at 
least when they are dependent on the refugee sponsor
11.  Ensure that extended family members are also eligible for family reunification 
when they are dependent on the sponsor.
12.  Ensure that the concept of dependency allows for a flexible assessment of the 
emotional, social, financial, and other ties and support between refugees and 
family members. If those ties have been disrupted due to factors related to 
flight, they should not be taken to signal that dependency has ceased.
13.  The criteria used to assess dependency should be in keeping with the legal 
concept developed in the Court’s case law and other legal guidance. They 
should be explained in clear and public guidelines or legal instruments, in 
order to enable refugees to tailor their applications accordingly.
Avoid discrimination between families formed before flight and after (pre- and 
post-flight families)
14.  Respect the duty of non-discrimination between family members, in particular 
pre- and post-flight family members. Refugees must be allowed to demonstrate 
their family links formed in exile or in flight. Any interference with refugees’ 
post-flight family relationships must be demonstrated to be necessary in a 
democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued.
Ensure that family reunification processes are not unduly delayed
15.  Waiting periods for refugee family reunification should not interfere with 
the right to family life. Waiting periods of over one year are inappropriate for 
refugees and for their family members.
16.  Waiting periods must be justified in the individual case and must be in accor-
dance with law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary and proportionate 
in the circumstances.
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Allow refugees sufficient time to apply for family reunification
17.  Abolish short time limits for family reunification applications, unless they are 
adapted to permit a first provisional application to be made by the refugee 
him- or herself in the country of asylum, allowing documentation and details 
to be submitted later.
Take measures to account for the particular (practical) problems refugees and 
their families face in reunification procedures
18.  Examine asylum claims and family reunification matters simultaneously, in 
particular for asylum seekers with manifestly strong protection claims.
19.  Refugees may face particular problems in gathering evidence to support their 
family reunification claims. As such, when assessing family relations, states 
should consider a range of evidence to demonstrate family ties, not only 
documentary proof. Flexible approaches should be adapted to the particular 
situations of different refugee populations.
20.  Develop guidelines to make clear which sorts of other evidence may be offered 
to demonstrate family links, if formal documentation is not acceptable or is 
unavailable.
21.  Ensure that documentation requirements do not put refugees’ at further risk 
from their countries of origin or imperil their family members. Where possible, 
adapt procedures to ensure that refugees and their family members are not 
required to engage with the authorities of the country of origin.
22.  Ensure that alternative travel documents are provided when national travel 
documents are not accepted or not available. This may include the use of  “1954 
Convention travel documents”2 or emergency International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) travel documents. Issue laissez-passers to family members 
who do not have the possibility to obtain national travel documents.
23.  Avoid imposing onerous integration conditions, such as the passing of excessively 
difficult integration tests in the country of origin as a condition of reunification.
Avoid routine use of DNA and other biometric assessments
24.  Avoid the routine use of DNA and other biometric assessments to establish 
family relationships. Establish standards to set relevant limits and safeguards 
in this regard.
25.  Resort to DNA testing to verify family relationships only where serious doubts 
remain after all other types of proof have been examined or where there are 
strong indications of fraudulent intent and DNA testing is considered the only 
reliable recourse to prove or disprove fraud.
26.  Regulate the maximum cost of DNA tests for family reunification and make 
provisions for the covering of cost by the state, in particular when the family 
relationship is subsequently confirmed.
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Ensure effective access to places where family reunification procedures can 
be initiated
27.  Enable family reunification applications to be presented in the country of 
asylum, avoiding the need for families to make dangerous and costly journeys 
to embassies.
28.  If states insist that family members should attend embassies and consulates in 
order to make applications, every effort should be made to ensure that these 
are practically accessible.
29.  Conduct a thorough review of embassy procedures and develop a clear set 
of protocols to facilitate family reunification, including by enabling online 
applications and appointments.
30.  For EU member states, if the sponsor’s state of residence has no embassy in his/
her family’s country of asylum, make use of the EU system that allows another 
member state to handle the issuing of visas.
Reduce practical barriers to family reunification
31.  Make information on the rules, procedures and documentary requirements 
for family reunification available in various pertinent languages online and 
via those actors who support refugees in regions of origin.
32.  Reduce or waive administrative and visa fees for refugees (broadly understood), 
where such costs may otherwise prevent family reunification.
33.  Establish financial support schemes for family reunification of those refugees 
who do not have sufficient resources to cover the costs.
Ensure that residence permits for family members enable legal protection and 
autonomy
34.  Grant spouses and family members who arrive on the basis of family reuni-
fication a legal status that enables them to enjoy full legal protection and 
independence. In particular, grant autonomous residence permits to spouses 
in accordance with the best practices and legal measures relating to violence 
against women and children.
For states bound by the Dublin Regulation: make full and flexible use of the 
family unity criteria
35.  Ensure wide interpretation and effective application of the Dublin family unity 
criteria.
36.  If the Dublin family unity provisions are ineffective, acknowledge and act on 
the positive duties under Article 8 of the Convention to bring family members 
together.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1.  The urgency and importance of family reunification for 
refugees
Council of Europe member states currently play host to many asylum seekers and 
refugees who have arrived in the past three years. While many have fled conflicts 
that will ultimately come to an end, they inevitably make their homes in European 
states for now. The increase in asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015 led to an 
understandable focus on their immediate reception and the processing of their 
asylum claims. In this context, the longer-term challenge of promoting successful 
integration into new host societies has often been ignored or sidelined.
Integration of migrants and refugees is a complex policy challenge that has implica-
tions for many human rights, such as the right to equality and non-discrimination, 
and access to social and economic rights, particularly employment, education, health 
care and housing. This issue paper is a concrete follow up to the Commissioner’s calls 
to European states to act decisively on integration, which were echoed in his 2016 
issue paper Time for Europe to get migrant integration right. In this context, family 
reunification is an urgent human rights issue and plays a vital stabilising role. As 
the Commissioner has put it:
 How can one integrate fully into one’s new host country without knowing that one’s 
spouse or children are safe? The first member of a family to have settled in the host 
country will assist and guide subsequent arriving members of the family in the integra-
tion process, thereby facilitating the government’s work.3
The Commissioner’s Human Rights Comment “Restrictive laws prevent families from 
reuniting” concluded that:
 immigrants and refugees, who are lawfully residing in a state, should be able to reunite 
with their family members as soon as possible, without going through laborious pro-
cedures. Being denied the human right to be with one’s family makes life more burden-
some – and integration much more difficult.4
The need to adapt family reunification rules to the particular situation of refugees was 
acknowledged in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 
1686 (2004) on human mobility and the right to family reunion. It recommended 
imposing less strict conditions for migrant applicants with respect to financial 
guarantees, health insurance and housing and, in particular, avoiding discrimination 
against women migrants and refugees which could result from the imposition of 
such measures.
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For refugees in particular, family reunification is imperative to integration.5 Article 34 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention obliges states to facilitate the integration of refu-
gees. Over the years the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
has repeatedly stated that: “the possibility of being reunited with one’s family is of 
vital importance to the integration process. Family members can reinforce the social 
support system of refugees and, in so doing, promote integration”.6 It is widely docu-
mented that being united with family members is a key priority for refugees upon 
arrival in a host country.7 The realities of refugee flight to Europe are such that only 
a tiny proportion of refugees are able to use safe and legal mechanisms to access 
asylum. Due to well understood access barriers, refugees generally make dangerous, 
irregular journeys in search of asylum.8
 Refugees who are reunited with their family 
benefit from a reinforced social support system 
which promotes their integration.
While some families do travel together to seek asylum, this is often not the case. 
Instead, conflict often separates families. The urgency of family reunification lies 
also in the fact that families left behind are often at great risk – in particular if they 
remain in conflict zones or are living precariously in countries in the region of conflict, 
where the protection available often falls well below international legal standards. In 
that context, swift family reunification is not only a matter of good policy, but may 
be equated with humanitarian evacuation. The Commissioner has stressed that for 
refugees, “delaying the enjoyment of their right to family reunion also denies effective 
protection to family members in camps and conflict zones”.9
Given that there are often few safe and legal routes to claim asylum in Europe, it is 
not unusual for one parent to travel ahead, leaving family behind in the hope that 
later, the family will be permitted to join him or her. In Germany, for example, it is 
estimated that the profile of Syrian refugees was such that between 0.9 and 1.2 
family members could ask for reunification.10 In the Netherlands, the estimate was 
1.2 family members.11 Notably, this contrasts sharply with the repeated suggestion 
in the media debate that three or four family members would join each refugee.12
 For families unable to reunite, the separation 
causes severe stress, social isolation and economic 
difficulties that prevent a normal life.
The negative effects of postponing family reunification on sponsors (the first family 
members arriving in a host state) and families are generally well documented.13 
Family separation is a significant cause of anxiety, with often debilitating psycho-
logical impact. Moreover, it is suggested that, “the longer the period of separation, 
the poorer the outcomes when the family reunites and the harder it is to regain its 
balance”.14 The Commissioner has emphasised that for families who are willing but 
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unable to reunite, the separation causes severe stress, social isolation and economic 
difficulties that prevent a normal life.15 Reports of the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) have outlined that restricting family reunification leads 
to people migrating irregularly, risking other human rights violations.16
These negative impacts are all the more evident in the case of refugees, since their 
lives will often be dominated by a constant fear about the situation of the family 
members left behind.17 Separation of family members during flight:
 can have devastating consequences on people’s well-being, as well as on their ability to 
rehabilitate from traumatic experiences of persecution and war and inhibit their ability 
to learn a new language, search for a job and adapt to their country of asylum.18
Notably, in two judgments rendered by the European Court of Human Rights in 2014, 
Mugenzi v. France and Tanda-Muzinga v. France, relating to Article 8 of the Convention 
and the family reunification process of refugee sponsors, the Court underlined that 
family unity is an essential right for refugees and that family reunification is a funda-
mental precondition for allowing persons who have fled persecution to re-establish 
a normal life.19 In addition, the Court usefully underlined that, especially in refugee 
cases, family reunification procedures should be flexible, prompt and effective.
1.2. Key terms explained
1.2.1.  Refugees – subsidiary protection beneficiaries – asylum seekers
This issue paper deals with family reunification of refugees. The term “refugee” may 
be understood narrowly or broadly. Narrowly construed, it refers to refugees within 
the meaning of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee 
Convention) – “1951 Convention refugees” in the terminology used in this issue paper. 
In EU law, 1951 Convention refugees (provided they are not EU nationals) are simply 
called “refugees”.20 In international law and practice, refugee status is declaratory, so 
“refugees” are refugees “as soon as they fulfil the criteria in the definition”.21 Accordingly, 
as a matter of international law, asylum seekers are presumptive refugees, and have 
a provisional right to remain until their status is determined.
States have a broader duty to protect persons from return than just 1951 Convention 
refugees. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits the 
return of persons to face torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment, even if they 
do not meet the conditions set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention.22 In EU law, as 
in many states, the category of “subsidiary protection beneficiary” is recognised. A 
subsidiary protection beneficiary in EU law is someone who may not be returned to 
their country as he or she faces “serious harm” if returned, namely the death penalty 
or execution; torture, inhuman or degrading treatment; and some individual risks 
from indiscriminate violence in conflict.23
Often, people fleeing war are seen by states as being eligible for subsidiary protec-
tion rather than refugee status. However, those fleeing war are often in fact 1951 
Convention refugees as they have a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the 
grounds listed in the Refugee Convention, such as religion or political opinion. On 
this basis, for example, UNHCR:
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 considers that most Syrians seeking international protection are likely to fulfil the require-
ments of the refugee definition contained in Article 1A(2) of the [Refugee Convention], 
since they will have a well-founded fear of persecution linked to one of the Convention 
grounds. For many civilians who have fled Syria the nexus to a 1951 Convention ground 
will lie in the direct or indirect, real or perceived association with one of the parties to 
the conflict.24
UNHCR’s recently issued guidelines on those fleeing conflict support this interpre-
tation of the 1951 Convention refugee definition.25
Formally, the legal categories are mutually exclusive – by definition, a subsidiary 
protection beneficiary is someone who is not a 1951 Convention refugee. However, 
in practice, whether any given applicant is granted one status or another depends on 
a variety of institutional and political factors. Looking across Europe, we see diverse 
patterns in recognition rates of the same nationalities. For instance, looking at appli-
cants from Syria, while in 2015 in Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom, Norway 
and Belgium most Syrian nationals granted protection were recognised as 1951 
Convention refugees, in Sweden, Cyprus, Spain, Malta and Hungary they tended to 
be granted subsidiary protection.26 This pattern is not new, and large-scale studies 
indicate that the interpretation and application of both the refugee and subsidiary 
protection definition varies significantly across Europe.27 While, as a matter of positive 
law, the categories are distinct, as regards individuals’ likelihood of recognition in 
one category or the other, there is considerable fluidity. Moreover, if those granted 
subsidiary protection appeal in order to establish their entitlement to recognition 
as a 1951 Convention refugee, they are often successful. So recognition as a 1951 
Convention refugee also often depends on individuals’ resources to bring appeals.
The diverse institutional practices mean that similarly situated individuals may be 
recognised as 1951 Convention refugees or subsidiary protection beneficiaries (or 
granted some residual domestic status) depending on where and when they claim 
asylum, and whether they have the inclination or resources to appeal the granting of 
subsidiary protection. There is a long-standing practice of siphoning asylum seekers 
into non-convention status, in particular in order to avoid the rights attached to the 
status of a 1951 Convention refugee. This is illustrated in recent German practice, 
where grants of subsidiary protection have increased markedly as the family reuni-
fication rights attaching to that status have diminished. In light of those institutional 
practices, as a matter of human rights law, all beneficiaries of international protection 
ought to be regarded as similarly situated and generally entitled to equal treatment.
In this paper, “asylum seeker” is used to connote individuals who have applied for 
international protection, whereas “refugee” is used in the broad sense, to encompass 
all international protection beneficiaries. Where the context demands differentia-
tion, we use the terms “1951 Convention refugees”, “subsidiary protection benefi-
ciaries”, and “other protection beneficiaries” to distinguish between different types 
of refugees. In EU law, both “1951 Convention refugees” and “subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries” together are “international protection beneficiaries”. It should also be 
noted that some national systems use different national legal terminology for these 
different categories. Where necessary, this terminology is explained in the pertinent 
description of national law and practice.
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1.2.2. Family members
The protection of the family in human rights law tends to take a broad conception 
of “family”, informed by the principle of non-discrimination.28 The European Court 
of Human Rights emphasises that family life is rooted in real connections, not only 
formal legal relationships. It is well established that “family life” within the meaning 
of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights exists in the case of rela-
tionships between married couples and non-married (stable) partners.29 The Court 
has long recognised that informal and religious marriages also fall under Article 8 of 
the Convention.30 More recently, the Court has acknowledged that same-sex couples 
in stable relationships enjoy family life together, even if they are not cohabiting.31 
As regards parents and their children, family ties are created from the moment of a 
child’s birth and only cease to exist under “exceptional circumstances”.32 As regards 
relationships between extended family members, such as those of parents and adult 
children, the Court accepts that they fall within the concept of  “family life” provided 
that additional factors of dependence, other than normal emotional ties, are shown 
to exist.33 In contrast, national immigration and asylum laws often take an unduly 
restrictive approach to defining family members, excluding adult children or family 
members who are not spouses.
 The right to family life also applies to informal 
or religious marriages, non-married partners, and 
between parents and dependent adult children. 
For purposes of exposition, this issue paper uses the term “immediate family” and 
“extended family”. “Immediate family” entails a spouse or life-partner, minor children 
and other dependent children. “Extended family” includes other family members, in 
particular (but not only) dependents. According to UNHCR, “a broad definition of a 
family unit – what may be termed an extended family – is necessary to accommodate 
the peculiarities in any given refugee situation”.34 As will be seen below, there are 
considerable tensions between tight formal national definitions, in particular when 
combined with demands for documentary proof of family links, and refugee realities. 
Together, they often render refugees’ family reunification rights ineffective in practice.
As regards refugees, one notable policy trend is to take a narrow conception of family 
reunification and to restrict the conception further to family units formed pre-flight. 
The notion of the pre-flight family is narrowly defined; for instance a family based 
on a marriage contracted in the refugee’s country of origin. Such definitions fail to 
appreciate the reality of refugees’ lives. Many refugees spend protracted periods 
in exile and in flight, and form families in transit, or while residing precariously in 
their regions of origin before they arrive in Europe. If the law requires families to be 
formed in the country of origin specifically, those pre-existing families may not fall 
under domestic family reunification provisions. In some circumstances, differentiating 
between pre- and post-flight families will violate Article 14 of the Convention,35 and 
in all likelihood other equality guarantees, including those under EU law.
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1.2.3. Family reunification and related terms
Family reunification refers to a range of legal processes.36 In the narrow sense of 
family reunification used throughout this paper, it means the re-forming in the host 
state of a family previously existing elsewhere. In some states, procedures to reunite 
refugees and their families may take various forms. For instance, in Spain there is both 
a procedure to extend refugee status, and a formal process called “family reunifica-
tion”. “Family formation” migration refers to migration in order to form a new family 
unit. Also pertinent may be “family retention”, protecting members of an existing 
family unit from expulsion, and “family regularisation”, offering family members a 
pathway to regular status once they arrive in the sponsor’s country of residence. 
However, the bulk of this issue paper focuses on family reunification.
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Chapter 2
Family reunification 
in international and 
European human 
rights standards
2.1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, Article 16, paragraph 3) provides 
that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the state. The ICCPR, which binds all Council of Europe 
member states, protects family life under Articles 17 and 23. Article 17 of the ICCPR 
states that, “ [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his … family”, and the second paragraph specifies that, “[e]veryone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”. Article 23 of the ICCPR 
provides that the family, “is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and 
is entitled to protection by society and the State”.37
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has affirmed that:
 the term “family”, for purposes of the Covenant, must be understood broadly as to include 
all those comprising a family as understood in the society concerned. The protection 
of such family is not necessarily obviated ... by the absence of formal marriage bonds, 
especially where there is a local practice of customary or common law marriage. Nor is 
the right to protection of family life necessarily displaced by geographical separation, 
infidelity, or the absence of conjugal relations. However, there must first be a family 
bond to protect.38
In its General Comment No. 15 on the position of aliens, while the HRC acknowledges 
that states may control entry of aliens to their territory, it notes that, “in certain circum-
stances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry 
or residence, for example, when considerations of … respect for family life arise”.39 
The HRC has examined some individual complaints concerning family reunification,40 
requiring that interferences with family life be provided for by law, in accordance 
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with the provisions, aims and objectives of the ICCPR and reasonable in the particular 
circumstances.41 The HRC interprets the requirement of reasonableness as implying 
that any interference “must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in 
the circumstances of any given case”.42 Considerations relating to the best interests 
of the child (Article 24 of the ICCPR) are attributed significant weight by the HRC.43
On refugees, El Dernawi v. Libya concerned a Libyan man who was granted asylum 
in Switzerland. His wife and children, who were still in Libya, were granted family 
reunification but they were unable to leave Libya as the authorities had confiscated 
their passports.44 The HRC noted that the actions of the Libyan authorities consti-
tuted a “definitive, and sole, barrier to the family being reunited in Switzerland”. As 
it was evident that, “a person granted refugee status under the 1951 Convention on 
the Status of Refugees, [could not] reasonably be expected to return to his country 
of origin”,45 the HRC concluded that the rights of the author and his family under 
Articles 17, 23 and 24 of the ICCPR had been violated.46 In Gonzalez v. Guyana the HRC 
held that the Guyanese authorities’ refusal to grant a residence permit to the Cuban 
husband of a Guyanese national constituted a violation of Article 17, paragraph 1, 
of the ICCPR.47 The HRC emphasised that it was evident that the couple could not 
live together in Cuba, and the state party had not indicated where else they might 
live as a couple.48
 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his family.
In the ICCPR periodic reports, family reunification has also been considered. In its 1996 
Concluding Observations on Switzerland, the HRC observed that, “family reunification 
is not authorized immediately for foreign workers who settle in Switzerland, but only 
after 18 months, which, in the Committee’s view, is too long a period for the foreign 
worker to be separated from his family”.49 In its 2007 Concluding Observations on 
France, the HRC expressed concern about the length of family reunification proce-
dures for recognised refugees.50 In its 2016 Concluding Observations on Denmark, 
while the HRC acknowledged the challenge of dealing with large numbers of asylum 
seekers, it expressed concern about the compatibility of the newly introduced three-
year waiting period for family reunification of temporary protection beneficiaries 
with the ICCPR.51
2.2. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
The right to family reunification is protected under Articles 9 and 10 of the CRC. 
Article 9 of the CRC obliges states to ensure that, “a child shall not be separated from 
his or her parents against their will, except when … such separation is necessary 
for the best interests of the child”. The first paragraph of Article 10 of the CRC refers 
directly to this provision and provides that, “applications by a child or his or her parents 
to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt 
with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner”.52 Furthermore, 
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Articles 16 and 22, paragraph 2, of the CRC relate to the right to family life, and are 
generally based on the logic of family unity.53 Article 16 of the CRC echoes Article 17 
of the ICCPR and prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with the child’s family 
life, while lastly, states are required to “trace the parents or other members of the 
family of any refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for reunification 
with his or her family” (Article 22, paragraph 2, of the CRC).
 States should deal with children’s family reunification 
in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. 
In its General Comment No. 6 on treatment of unaccompanied and separated children 
outside their country of origin, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
confirms that only the child’s best interests could impede family reunification of an 
unaccompanied or separated child in the situation of separation in different coun-
tries.54 The UNCRC further elaborates that family reunification of a child in the country 
of origin is not in his or her best interests if “there is a ‘reasonable risk’ that such a 
return would lead to the violation of fundamental human rights of the child”.55 In a 
number of concluding observations, the UNCRC recognises that the practice in some 
countries of failing to ensure family reunification or permitting it with unnecessarily 
restrictive conditions constitutes a serious “protection gap” faced by children.56 In its 
Concluding Observations on Poland, the UNCRC criticises the procedures on family 
reunification for imposing excessively demanding requirements for documenta-
tion and physical verification of applications and recommends Poland to “[t]ake all 
necessary measures to safeguard the principle of family unity for refugees and their 
children, including by making administrative requirements for family unification 
more flexible and affordable”.57
Notably, a legal analysis conducted for the German Lower House of Parliament 
concluded that the only way to ensure Germany’s compliance with its obligations 
under the CRC was to generally allow family reunification with minor children and 
accept applications within the two-year waiting period.58
2.3. International refugee law on family reunification
The 1951 Refugee Convention itself is silent on the issue of family reunification. 
However, the Final Act of the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries states that, “the 
unity of the family … is an essential right of the refugee”.59 It emphasised that the 
family is threatened in refugee situations, and urged governments to:
 take the necessary measures for the protection of the refugee’s family, especially with a 
view to … [e]nsuring that the unity of the refugee’s family is maintained particularly in 
cases where the head of the family has fulfilled the necessary conditions for admission 
to a particular country.
At the same time, it also stressed the special needs of children, particularly unac-
companied minors who have been separated from their parents. In the chapter on 
the principle of family unity in its handbook, UNHCR notes that this recommendation 
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in the Final Act is observed by the majority of states, whether or not they are parties 
to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol.60
Over the years UNHCR has issued a number of notes and guidelines on family 
reunification.61 Importantly, its Executive Committee (ExCom, comprised of state 
representatives) has repeatedly stressed the importance of family reunification 
for refugees.62 While these conclusions are not legally binding, they are generally 
accepted as constituting “soft law”, which aids in the interpretation and application 
of refugee law instruments. In its 2001 background note on family reunification in 
the context of resettlement and integration, UNHCR identifies five guiding principles 
which promote and facilitate family reunification.63 
a.  The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by states.
b.  The refugee family is essential to ensure the protection and well-being of its 
individual members.
c.  The principle of dependency entails flexible and expansive family reunification 
criteria that are culturally sensitive and situation specific.
d. Humanitarian considerations support family reunification efforts.
e. The refugee family is essential to the successful integration of resettled refugees.
2.4. European Social Charter
Article 19, paragraph 6, of the European Social Charter requires member states to 
facilitate as far as possible the reunion of family members with foreign workers, 
who reside legally in the country. Recital 16 of the revised European Social Charter 
underlines that the family as a fundamental unit of society has the right to appro-
priate social, legal and economic protection to ensure its full development.64 The 
European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) in its 2015 conclusions observed that 
the rights of the Charter are to be enjoyed to the fullest extent possible by refugees, 
and that the obligations undertaken by states under the European Social Charter 
“require a response to the specific needs of refugees and asylum seekers, such as 
… the liberal administration of the right to family reunion”.65
The ECSR has examined many restrictions by contracting states on family reunifica-
tion and found them incompatible with Article 19 of the Charter. For example, where 
requirements for language or integration tests, or courses and added fees were liable 
to impede rather than facilitate family reunion, they are contrary to Article 19, para-
graph 6, of the Charter.66 The ECSR has underlined that restrictions on family reunion 
in the form of requirements for sufficient or suitable accommodation should not be 
so restrictive as to prevent any family reunion.67 The 2015 conclusions of the ECSR 
found that most countries investigated did not meet the requirements in Article 19 
of the Charter.68 For example, the ECSR found that the requirement in Section 32 of 
the German Residence Act, according to which children over the age of 16 wishing 
to move to Germany to live with one parent must prove that they speak German, is 
not in conformity with the Charter, because it presents an obstacle to family reunion.
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Chapter 3
Family reunification in 
the European Court of 
Human Rights’ case law
3.1. Family reunification for refugees
The Court has developed its case law on family reunification over decades and has 
sought to reconcile states’ migration control prerogatives with the right to respect 
for family life.69 In general, migrants must demonstrate that family life cannot be 
enjoyed “elsewhere” in order to show that the refusal of family reunification will violate 
Article 8 of the Convention. The case law has developed over time to become more 
protective of human rights, in particular when the rights of children are at issue.70 
While earlier judgments set an extremely high standard for family reunification, 
requiring applicants to demonstrate that reunification was the only way to (re-)
establish family life,71 the standard now is that applicants must show that reunion 
is the “most adequate” way to family life.72
In the case of refugees (broadly understood), the Court has been sensitive to their 
particular situation and has strengthened the protection of their right to family 
reunification. In two respects, family reunification of refugees differs from that of non-
refugees. Firstly, the “elsewhere” approach cannot be applied given the predicament 
of refugees. There can be no question of refugees being subject to an obligation to 
re-establish family life in their country of origin. In the case of refugees (and others 
who are non-returnable for practical reasons)73 there are ipso facto “insurmountable 
obstacles” to establishing family life in the country of origin. Moreover, it is also inap-
propriate to assume that refugees can be required to move to third states. As the 
Court’s extensive case law on the transfer of asylum seekers has shown, any transfer 
of a refugee or potential refugee requires a careful individual analysis of the human 
rights implications of the transfer.74 Secondly, the Court tends to take into account 
whether parents had voluntarily left children in their country of origin as a factor 
potentially weighing against family reunification. In the case of refugees, who are by 
definition forced to flee, the Court acknowledges that they are often also compelled 
by circumstances to leave family members behind.
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The distinctive approach to family reunification for refugees emerges when con-
trasting two important cases, Tuquabo-Tekle v. the Netherlands75 and the earlier case 
of Gül v. Switzerland.76 In the former case, a mother left her daughter behind when 
she fled Eritrea to seek asylum, following the death of her husband. Her protection 
needs were recognised not as a 1951 Convention refugee, but rather with another 
form of (less secure) humanitarian protection. Nonetheless, the Court remarked that 
it was questionable whether the mother left her daughter behind of “her own free 
will”. Accordingly, it was held that the Netherlands was obliged under Article 8 of the 
Convention to admit her daughter to the territory, so that they could enjoy family 
life together there. In contrast, in Gül v. Switzerland, the Court found no violation in 
Switzerland’s refusal to grant admission to a son to rejoin his father in Switzerland. 
In that case, the father had sought asylum in Switzerland, but was merely granted 
a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. Considerable time had passed since 
then, and the father recently had made several visits to his son in Turkey. The Court 
held that there were no longer “strong humanitarian grounds” for the father to 
remain in Switzerland, so re-establishing family life in Turkey would be practicable.
This analysis reveals that family reunification is generally the only way to protect the 
right to respect of family life of refugees’ with current protection needs. This view is 
confirmed by two notable 2014 judgments of the Court in Tanda-Muzinga v. France77 
and Mugenzi v. France.78 Both applicants were recognised refugees in France, who 
submitted family reunion applications in 2003 and 2007 respectively. In both cases, 
the children were in third countries. They both confronted insurmountable difficul-
ties in the procedure. In the Mugenzi case, a cursory dental examination was used to 
cast doubt on the child’s age as disclosed on his birth certificate. As a result, reunion 
was refused. All domestic appeals against this finding were refused and the children 
became adults with the passage of time. In the Tanda-Muzinga case, the authorities 
also questioned the authenticity of the identity documents. After several years of 
appeals and challenges, they were finally granted reunification.
Importantly, the Court emphasised that the applicants’ status as refugees meant that 
their application for family reunion should be dealt with “speedily, attentively and with 
especial care, considering that the acquisition of an international protection status is 
proof that the person concerned is in a vulnerable position”.79 The Court noted that 
the need for a special procedure for family reunification of refugees was recognised 
in international and European law. It found that the French procedure had failed to 
guarantee “the flexibility, speed and efficiency” to respect the right to family life.80
In 2016 in I.A.A. and Others v. the United Kingdom81 the Court examined a case con-
cerning the admission of five children of a Somali woman resident in the UK. The 
children were living in Ethiopia, having been previously in the care of an aunt. The 
mother had moved to the UK in 2003 to join her second husband, a refugee. The 
Court held that on the facts, the mother could relocate to Ethiopia, as there were no 
“insurmountable obstacles” or “major impediments” to her doing so.82 Concerning 
the possibility of returning to Somalia, the Court emphasised that although she was 
married to a refugee, “neither she nor any of her children (including the applicants) 
[had] been granted refugee status and the applicants [had] not sought to argue that 
they would be at risk of ill-treatment were they to return to Somalia”.83 Clearly, had 
she demonstrated that she was in need of international protection, the case would 
have been dealt with differently.
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3.2.  “Best interests of the child” in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights
A notable trend in the Court’s case law is the increased prominence and weight 
attached to the “best interests of the child” principle, as evidenced in Mugenzi v. 
France84 and Tanda-Muzinga v. France.85 In these cases, the Court emphasised that 
where family reunification involves children, the national authorities must give 
precedence to the best interests of the child in the review of proportionality of the 
interference with family life.86 Similarly, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands87 and Neulinger and 
Shuruk v. Switzerland88 (although not dealing with refugees) are also illustrative of the 
Court’s great emphasis on “best interest” considerations in recent years. In Jeunesse 
v. the Netherlands this is in fact one of the main reasons why the Court for the first 
time held that Article 8 of the Convention had been violated in a case concerning 
family reunification of a spouse. In these cases, the Court referred specifically to the 
CRC and the UNCRC general comments.
3.3. Equal treatment and family reunification
A key policy trend is differences in treatment between 1951 Convention refugees and 
subsidiary protection and/or other protection beneficiaries. The non-discrimination 
guarantee under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights renders 
these distinctions legally suspect. Article 14 of the Convention must be invoked in 
conjunction with another Convention right, but in family reunification cases, Article 8 
of the Convention is invariably engaged, so that poses no obstacle. Article 14 of 
the Convention is an open-ended non-discrimination guarantee, so it is possible to 
challenge discrimination on suspect grounds, such as sex, race and sexual orienta-
tion, as well as differences in treatment between similarly situated individuals and 
groups where the discrimination is on grounds of “other status”. There are different 
standards of justification for these different types of discrimination. In the former 
case, particularly strong justifications must be offered, while in the latter case, states 
may justify differences in treatment if they pursue a legitimate aim and if there is a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised. Notably, the Court has explained that the margin of apprecia-
tion is restricted when discrimination is based on an immutable characteristic, and 
has suggested that the margin is similarly restricted where the difference of treat-
ment is grounded on refugee status since it does not entail an element of choice.89
 Refugees’ family reunification requires 
adequate and swift attention.
The Court has in recent years rendered several judgments on discrimination as 
regards family reunification. In Biao v. Denmark, the Grand Chamber found a viola-
tion of Article 14 of the Convention in the difference in treatment between certain 
categories of Danish nationals regarding family reunification, allowing only those 
who had been Danish nationals for 28 years to enjoy the right.90 The workings of the 
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Danish rules were found to amount to indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnicity. 
Since it follows from case law that, “[n]o difference in treatment based exclusively 
or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being justified in a 
contemporary democratic society”,91 the Court went on to examine whether this 
indirect discrimination could be justified by “compelling or very weighty reasons 
unrelated to ethnic origin” and answered in the negative.92 It found that the 28-year 
rule was based on undocumented, partly biased, general assumptions and “rather 
speculative arguments” about when Danish nationals had created strong ties with 
Denmark and that this rule, when applied to the applicant, did not allow for his 
strong ties to Denmark to be taken into account.
 Differences in family reunification rights granted 
to persons with subsidiary protection and 1951 
Convention refugees should be avoided.
In Pajić v. Croatia, the Court found a violation of Article 14 (in connection with 
Article 8 of the Convention) in the fact that Croatian family reunification rules per-
mitted no applications from same-sex couples.93 As stable relationships between 
(even non-cohabiting) same-sex couples attract legal protection as family life under 
Article 8 of the Convention, the difference in treatment fell to be considered under 
Article 14 (read together with Article 8). The difference in treatment on grounds of 
sexual orientation was in need of strong justification, but none was offered by the 
respondent state. Hode and Abdi v. the United Kingdom94 concerned the difference in 
treatment between refugees’ spouses who married post-flight and other migrants 
entitled to family reunification. The Court held that refugees with post-flight spouses 
were similarly situated to migrant students and workers, who were entitled to family 
reunification irrespective of when the marriage was contracted. The similarity was 
rooted in the fact that “as students and workers, whose spouses were entitled to 
join them, were usually granted a limited period of leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom, the Court considers that they too were in an analogous position to the 
applicants for the purpose of Article 14 of the Convention”.95 The UK failed to demon-
strate that this difference in treatment pursued a legitimate aim sufficient for such 
difference to be justified.
The UK had attempted to argue that it treated migrant workers and students better 
as it was attempting to attract them to the UK, while it was accepting refugees as 
a matter of international obligation, but not seeking to compete with other states 
to attract them.96 While the Court held that offering incentives to certain groups of 
immigrants may amount to a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 14 of the 
Convention, it noted that this justification had not previously been offered by the 
UK for this policy.97 In Niedzwiecki v. Germany the Court, echoing the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, held that it could not discern sufficient reasons justifying a dif-
ference of treatment between non-nationals as regards access to child benefits which 
was based on the type of residence permit.98 In its reasoning, which was upheld by 
the Court, the German Federal Constitutional Court pointed out that insofar as the 
distinction was aimed at limiting the grant of child benefits to aliens who were likely 
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to stay permanently in Germany, the criteria applied were inappropriate to achieve 
that aim since the fact that a person held a limited residence title did not constitute 
a sufficient basis for predicting the duration of his or her stay in Germany.99
Concerning the inequality of treatment between 1951 Convention refugees and 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries, it appears that this status inequality is difficult 
to reconcile with Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 8 of 
the Convention. Following the case law outlined above, the reasoning implies that 
subsidiary protection status is also an “other status” under Article 14. With respect 
to their right to family life, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are in 
“analogous, or relevantly similar, situations”. The Court has already examined other 
status distinctions between refugees and other migrants, and between different 
categories of migrants, and indeed between different categories of citizens. In Hode 
and Abdi v. the United Kingdom, refugees were treated as being in a relevantly similar 
situation to student and labour migrants. In all respects, their situation is even closer 
to subsidiary protection beneficiaries. Once this is accepted, it falls to the state to 
prove the objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment.
While the Court has not dealt directly with the issue, the principles in its case law 
cast doubt on the potential justifications offered by states. There appear to be two 
possible lines of justification for the difference in treatment. The first seeks to justify 
the difference in the privileged position of 1951 Convention refugees in international 
law. The second relates to the time-bound nature of the protection need of subsid-
iary protection beneficiaries. This first justification has little merit; 1951 Convention 
refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries are often similarly situated in that 
they are protected from return under international law. Many subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries are protected against return under international human rights law, for 
instance.
Nor is the second justification convincing, either legally or empirically. Legally, 1951 
Convention refugee status is also temporary. It is subject to cessation on various 
grounds, including if there is a sustainable change in circumstances in the refugees’ 
country of origin.100 Both 1951 Convention refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection have a reasonable prospect of remaining in the country of refuge in 
the longer term or permanently. This is acknowledged notably in EU law, as both 
categories of international protection beneficiaries potentially come under the EU 
Long-Term Residents Directive.101
Empirically, the profiles of subsidiary protection beneficiaries and 1951 Convention 
refugees are often very similar. The length of their stay will be determined primarily 
by the continuation of the reasons for fleeing their country of origin, not by the dura-
tion of the residence permit they were granted. If the protection need is still present, 
a permit granted for one or two years only must (and indeed in all likelihood will in 
practice) be extended. If it were not, and there was still a real risk on return, the law 
would require extension of protection from refoulement. In Niedzwiecki v. Germany, the 
Court held that it did not discern sufficient reasons to justify the different treatment 
with regard to child benefits of aliens who were in possession of a stable residence 
permit and those who held a limited residence permit that was renewed every two 
years. Hence, the different treatment violated Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
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Article 8 of the Convention.102 A fortiori, in the case of 1951 Convention refugees 
and other international protection beneficiaries, although they may be granted 
residence permits of different durations, this does not provide a basis from which 
to infer that they warrant different treatment.
To conclude, differences in treatment between 1951 Convention refugees and sub-
sidiary protection beneficiaries are difficult to square with Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (and indeed with the analogous EU general principle 
of equality and non-discrimination) and so should be reconsidered promptly.
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Chapter 4
EU law on family 
reunification
Over half of the Council of Europe’s member states’ laws on family reunification are 
directly affected by rules of European Union law. For a proper understanding of 
the regulation of family reunification in many states, then, a discussion of EU law is 
necessary. Below, both EU primary law (in particular fundamental rights guarantees) 
and secondary law setting out precise rules for family reunification to be applied in 
EU member states are discussed.
4.1. Primary EU law
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR) contains several 
provisions relevant to refugee family reunification rights. Article 7 of the EUCFR guar-
antees everyone’s right to respect for his or her family life. The non-discrimination 
clause in Article 21 prohibits discrimination on an open-ended list of grounds (in 
that respect like Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights), reflect-
ing the general principle of equality in EU law. This principle means that, insofar as 
they are similarly situated, treating refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries 
differently requires justification. Article 51, paragraph 1, of the EUCFR states that the 
EUCFR applies to the member states only “when they are implementing Union law”, 
a phrase that is interpreted broadly.
EU law on asylum and immigration measures must be interpreted in a manner con-
sistent with the charter.103 Its influence is seen in many domains. In MA and Others v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department for example, the Dublin Regulation was 
interpreted in the light of Article 24, paragraph 2, of the EUCFR so as to vindicate 
the “best interests” of the child principle.104 Similarly, EU fundamental rights prin-
ciples have had some significant impact on asylum procedures, notably the A and 
Others v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie case, in rooting out some evidential 
practices that were deemed to violate human dignity and privacy.105 The right to 
effective judicial protection (Article 47 of the EUCFR), together with the right to good 
administration (Article 41 of the EUCFR), has been applied to subsidiary protection 
processes, even when the relevant EU procedural directive did not then explicitly 
govern the procedures.106 Concerning time limits, while short time limits are some-
times acceptable, if there is evidence that they impede the effective enforcement 
of rights, their legality is in doubt.107 This holds even if those time limits are ostensi-
bly permitted in EU legislation, as is the case with the three-month limit for family 
reunification of refugees under the FRD. Any rigid application of that limit will be of 
dubious legality in the light of the principle of effectiveness.
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4.2. Secondary EU law
4.2.1. The Family Reunification Directive
The main secondary EU law measure dealing with family reunification rights of 
third-country nationals (that is, those who do not hold the nationality of an EU 
member state) is the FRD of 2003.108 The UK, Ireland and Denmark are not bound 
by the FRD. In general, it creates an individual right to family reunification and must 
be interpreted in light of EU fundamental rights and the Convention as well as the 
principles set out in Articles 5(5) and 17 of the FRD.109 The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has tended to interpret family reunification as the rule, such 
that any discretion to limit the right must be construed narrowly.110
Explicitly, the FRD applies to sponsors (of third-country nationality), who hold a 
residence permit valid for one year or more and who have reasonable prospects of 
obtaining the right of permanent residence.111 It applies to 1951 Convention refugees, 
and indeed establishes important preferential rules for their family reunification, when 
compared with other migrants (Chapter V). However, it explicitly does not apply to 
i) asylum seekers; ii) applicants for or beneficiaries of temporary protection; and iii) 
applicants for or beneficiaries of  “a subsidiary form of protection in accordance with 
international obligations, national legislation or the practice of the Member States” 
(Article 3(2) of the FRD). As regards subsidiary protection beneficiaries with a status 
granted under EU law, it is at least arguable that they are covered by the FRD, as 
they are not explicitly excluded. Admittedly, some member states seem to assume 
that they are not obligated by the FRD to apply its provisions to this category. It is 
also important to recall that the EU general principle of equality prohibits distinc-
tions between similarly situated persons, as does Article 14 of the Convention. On 
this basis, the lawfulness of affording the privileges of Chapter V of the FRD only to 
1951 Convention refugees is in doubt.
In 2008, the Commission noted that at least nine member states in their national 
legislation apply the FRD to subsidiary protection beneficiaries despite them being 
excluded from its scope.112 In 2014, the Commission stated that, “the humanitarian 
protection needs of persons benefiting from subsidiary protection do not differ from 
those of refugees, and encourages [the member states] to adopt rules that grant 
similar rights to refugees and beneficiaries of temporary or subsidiary protection”.113 
It also praised a number of member states for not applying the restrictions at all to 
refugees, “in recognition of the particular plight of refugees and the difficulties they 
often face in applying for family reunification”.114
The meaning of “dependent” is not defined in the FRD, but as mentioned previ-
ously, the Commission uses guidance from the jurisprudence on family members 
of EU citizens to inform the concept, which takes a broad view of “dependency”.115 
Dependency, in this context, is the result of a factual situation characterised by 
the fact that legal, financial, emotional or material support for that family member 
is provided by the sponsor or by his or her spouse/partner.116 There is no need to 
inquire into the reasons for that support, or whether the family member could find 
some other means of support.117
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4.2.2. The Qualification Directive – original and recast
The Qualification Directive (QD)118 purports to harmonise the qualification of third-
country nationals as 1951 Convention refugees or subsidiary protection beneficiaries. 
The recast QD does not apply to the UK, Ireland and Denmark, although the UK and 
Ireland opted into the original version of that measure.119 The definition of family 
member in Article 2(j) of the QD refers to “members of the family of the beneficiary 
of international protection who are present in the same Member State in relation 
to the applicant for international protection”. The aim of that definition is to exclude 
“from family unification, under this Directive, family members that are in the host 
country for different reasons (e.g. work) or that are in another Member State or in 
a third country”.120
Article 23, paragraph 1, of the QD states that “Member States shall ensure that family 
unity can be maintained”. It has been argued that it may have a function to protect 
family unity in case of expulsion.121 Its general wording also suggests that it applies 
to admission decisions.122 The definition of family member refers to relationships 
that “already existed in the country of origin”. Peers et al. suggest that this limitation:
 disregards the fact that refugees may form genuine and lasting family relationships 
during or after flight, ties which are also protected by Article 8 [of the] ECHR ... Whether 
this complies with the principle of non-discrimination in relation to the right to respect 
for family life remains open to question.123
Notably, it is also narrower than the FRD, which refers to the refugee’s family where 
the relationships “predate their entry” (Article 9, paragraph 2, of the FRD).
 Authorities must ensure that family 
unity can be maintained.
In 2016, the Commission adopted a proposal to recast the directive once more.124 
The proposal also includes an extended definition of family members, taking into 
account the different circumstances of dependency, and covering post-flight fam-
ily members.125 UNHCR welcomed the extension of the scope of family members, 
“reflecting the reality of often prolonged periods of transit”, and advising member 
states to turn this optional clause into a mandatory one.126
4.2.3. Family reunification issues under the Dublin Regulation
Certain provisions in the Dublin Regulation (604/2013), if properly applied, may 
contribute to the maintenance of family unity and even result in bringing about 
family reunification for asylum seekers.127 According to Recital 15, for example:
 The processing together of the applications for international protection of the members 
of one family by a single Member State makes it possible to ensure that the applications 
are examined thoroughly, the decisions taken in respect of them are consistent and the 
members of one family are not separated.
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The regulation deals with family members already in the EU but living separated in 
different member states. In order of priority, the state responsible is the one where:
 ► a family member of an unaccompanied minor is legally present,128 or if there 
is no such state, where the unaccompanied minor makes his/her most recent 
application;129
 ► a family member has been recognised as a refugee or has an outstanding 
asylum application (note the narrow definition of family under the Dublin II 
Regulation has been broadened by the Dublin III Regulation).130
However, the application of these provisions has been widely criticised as insuffi-
cient in practice.131 A UNHCR study conducted between October 2015 and February 
2016 in nine countries, including France and the United Kingdom, examined the 
application of the Dublin Regulation in those countries. UNHCR concluded that 
the procedure for assigning member state responsibility was protracted and that 
family applications were not prioritised in practice. The reasons given for the delays 
included lengthy family tracing procedures, delays in conducting age assessments, 
and different documentary and evidential requirements for establishing family links 
among member states (including as regards DNA tests). Given these serious practical 
difficulties, family members often remain separated although they have a legal right 
in EU law to have their asylum claim determined together.
 Correctly implementing family reunification  
rules within the Dublin System would 
considerably reduce human suffering. 
In January 2016, the UK courts considered the position of unaccompanied minors 
living in the informal camp in Calais, France, who had close family members in the UK, 
including recognised 1951 Convention refugees.132 Normally, they would be required 
to claim asylum in France and then request the French authorities to request the UK 
authorities to take charge of their claims on the basis of the family unity criteria in the 
Dublin Regulation. The applicants argued that this process would not vindicate their 
right to respect for their family life under Article 8 of the Convention. The tribunal 
held that the Dublin Regulation has the status of “a material consideration of unde-
niable potency in the proportionality balancing exercise” and that any “vindication 
of an Article 8 human rights challenge will require a strong and persuasive case on 
its merits. Judges will not lightly find that, in a given context, Article 8 operates in 
a manner which permits circumvention of the Dublin Regulation procedures and 
mechanisms, whether in whole or in part”.133 However, on the particular facts, the 
tribunal held that Article 8 entitled the applicants to swift admission to the UK, once 
they claimed asylum in France. On appeal,134 the court of appeal held that greater 
evidence ought to be required to bypass the Dublin mechanisms than had been 
required by the lower court but that, nonetheless, it should be done if there was an 
“especially compelling case” that otherwise the right to family life would be violated.135
The Dublin system, were it made to operate correctly, offers family members of 
asylum seekers the opportunity to have their claims examined in the same state. 
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This would considerably reduce human suffering. As well as being beneficial to the 
asylum seekers themselves, this mode of protection for family unity could also offer 
significant efficiency gains for states, as they would not face irregular movement or 
later family reunification applications.
4.2.4. Temporary Protection Directive
The first instrument of EU law granting the right to family reunification to persons 
in need of protection is the Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55 (TPD).136 It has 
been noted that there is a consensus on the need for prompt reunification during 
temporary protection, especially where the protection results in extended periods of 
residence in the country of asylum.137 So far, the TPD has not been applied in practice, 
since the Council of Ministers has not adopted a decision establishing the existence 
of a mass influx of displaced persons, required by Article 5 of the TPD. Nonetheless it 
is noteworthy that the TPD sets out rules on family reunification: Article 15 sets three 
conditions, namely that the family ties existed already in the country of origin, that 
the ties were disrupted due to circumstances surrounding the mass influx, and that 
the family members must be either beneficiaries of temporary protection themselves 
(but present in another member state) or in need of protection.






5.1. Limitations on beneficiaries of family reunification
5.1.1.  1951 Convention refugees v. subsidiary protection  
beneficiaries
Most states in Europe have greatly restricted family reunification rights over the 
past years. Typical restrictions include high income, integration and accommoda-
tion requirements.
Integration tests and requirements have attracted particular criticism for their 
counterproductive nature, a matter on which the Commissioner has previously com-
mented.138 Overall, a 2013 comparative study on family reunification and integration 
requirements concludes that:
 The restrictive measures on the admission and residence of family members have not 
furthered integration and in many cases may have actually impeded it. Being excluded 
means, in any case, that integration is not promoted. Delay in the process means that 
the family members live separately, and thus, focus on the process and not on the host 
society. Children are badly affected by the delay, because they miss at least one parent 
and their language learning and integration process are delayed.139
These requirements are generally viewed as posing a particular, often insurmount-
able, barrier for refugee sponsors. In that context, EU law (discussed above) and 
national law and practice generally create some formal preferential treatment for 
the family reunification of refugees. However, in 2012, UNHCR reported that despite 
the more favourable provisions for refugee family reunification set out in EU legis-
lation, “throughout Europe, many practical obstacles in the family reunification 
process lead to prolonged separation, significant procedural costs and no realistic 
possibility of success”.140 This means that refugees’ apparently privileged access to 
family reunification is often ineffective.
In its Recommendation 1686 (2004) on human mobility and the right to family 
reunion, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), while welcoming 
the preferential treatment granted to refugees in the FRD, expressed its regret that 
it does not recognise the right to family reunion for persons granted subsidiary pro-
tection. PACE urged European states to “grant the right to family reunion to persons 
benefiting from subsidiary protection”.141
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While some states continue to treat 1951 Convention refugees and subsidiary protec-
tion beneficiaries in the same manner as regards family reunification, there is a strong 
trend to differentiate. In this section, we highlight those significant refugee-hosting 
states that do formally distinguish between these different categories.
This trend is evident in Germany, which, given its prominence as a refugee-hosting 
state, warrants particular attention. It is estimated that in 2015 approximately 800 000 
persons arrived in Germany seeking international protection. Many were unable to 
formally apply for asylum until 2016. One policy response was to postpone family 
reunification for persons granted subsidiary protection for two years.142 At the time 
the measure was adopted, most applicants from key refugee producing states 
(notably Syria) were being recognised as 1951 Convention refugees. After the new 
restriction on family reunification entered into force in March 2016, there was a 
sharp rise in subsidiary protection grants. These subsidiary protection beneficiaries 
would not be entitled to file an application for family reunification until after March 
2018. Notably too, of those granted subsidiary protection, almost 26 000 persons 
(29%) filed an appeal against this decision, creating a large additional burden for 
the administration and the courts. Of the 2 365 appeals decided by the end of 
October 2016, three quarters resulted in the appellant being recognised as a 1951 
Convention refugee.143 Among appellants from Syria, the rate of success on appeal 
(that is, when the outcome was that the appellant ought to have been recognised 
as a 1951 Convention refugee) was 81%.144
 Throughout Europe, many practical obstacles lead 
 to prolonged separation, significant procedural 
costs and no realistic possibility of success for 
refugees seeking to reunite with their family.
In Hungary since 2011, subsidiary protection beneficiaries have been excluded from 
the more favourable rules for refugees.145 Subsidiary protection beneficiaries must 
meet the stringent rules that apply to other migrants, as must 1951 Convention 
refugees that apply outside the three-month time limit. In Cyprus, a law introduced 
in 2014 removed the preferential right to family reunification from 1951 Convention 
refugees and excluded beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from the right to family 
reunification altogether.146 In Greece, only 1951 Convention refugees, and not sub-
sidiary protection beneficiaries, are covered by the family reunification legislation 
implementing the FRD.147 UNHCR has criticised this facet of Greek law.148 In order 
to benefit from the preferential rules, refugees must apply within three months of 
recognition. Otherwise, they must meet requirements as to employment and per-
manent accommodation. Procedures are known to be cumbersome and protracted, 
although there is little data from which to assess their workings overall.149
In Sweden, for example, a new temporary law entered into force in July 2016, which 
removed the right to family reunification for subsidiary protection beneficiaries 
altogether.150  It applies to those who applied for asylum after 24 November 2015.151 
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The law will remain in force until July 2019. It was introduced as part of a package 
of measures to reduce the numbers of people seeking refuge in Sweden.152 As the 
numbers of people seeking asylum there subsequently have fallen dramatically 
(apparently for reasons unrelated to the Swedish policy changes), it remains to be 
seen if the political promise to revisit the restrictions will be implemented. The only 
saving provision in the measure provides that family reunification should be granted 
even to subsidiary protection beneficiaries if it would otherwise violate Swedish 
obligations under international law.153
 In Europe, there is a strong trend to differentiate 
between the family reunification rights of 
1951 Convention refugees and those granted 
subsidiary protection. This should be avoided.
In Finland, the main difference in treatment between 1951 Convention refugees and 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries is that the requirement to demonstrate means 
of support applies invariably to the latter category as of 1 July 2016. The income 
levels set as means of support criteria are very high,154 and often create a barrier for 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries.
5.1.2. Child refugees
Most states permit unaccompanied minors to apply for family reunification with their 
parents. This entitlement often contributes to disputes about age, in particular for child 
refugees from countries with poor recording of births, such as Afghanistan. Human 
rights concerns about the reliability and appropriateness of age assessment processes 
are now well established.155 In particular, the lack of probity of medical methods of 
age assessment has been established.156 The Commissioner has reiterated that age 
determination of unaccompanied minor migrants is a complex process involving 
physical, social and cultural factors and that incorrect age assessment may result in 
detrimental consequences for the child concerned, including wrongful detention. 
Therefore, age assessment should not depend only on a medical examination.157 
PACE has resolved as follows on this matter:
 age assessment should only be carried out if there are reasonable doubts about a person 
being underage. The assessment should be based on the presumption of minority, involve 
a multidisciplinary evaluation by an independent authority over a period of time and 
not be based exclusively on medical assessment. Examinations should only be carried 
out with the consent of the child or his or her guardian. They should not be intrusive 
and should comply with medical ethical standards. The margin of error of medical and 
other examinations should be clearly indicated and taken into account. If doubts remain 
that the person may be underage, he or she should be granted the benefit of the doubt. 
Assessment decisions should be subject to administrative or judicial appeal.158
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In most states, the right to family reunification of unaccompanied minor refugees 
only extends to their parents. Where it does not extend to other family members, this 
often leads to great hardship and family separation, as parents must choose to leave 
behind other children if they wish to avail themselves of the right to reunification with 
an unaccompanied minor.
 Human rights concerns about the reliability 
and appropriateness of age assessment 
processes are well established.
In contrast, in the UK, there is no provision in statute to allow child refugees to apply 
to have their parents come to join them in the UK. However, an Upper Tribunal 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) decision in 2016 held that refusal to grant 
admission would violate Article 8 of the Convention.159 The decision took account of 
the human rights standards (Convention and CRC) and also noted the constrained (if 
fairly typical) circumstances of the young refugee. The judge accepted that if family 
reunification in the UK was not enabled, the child refugee would be:
 driven to consider alternatives, some of them manifestly dangerous given his youth 
and unaccompanied and unsupported status. These include the precarious journey 
involved in attempting to reunite with the [parents] wherever they may be at present. 
The evidence points to the probability that they are either in Khartoum or the UNHCR 
refugee camp several hundred kilometres away. The situations in both locations are 
fraught with danger and imbued with deprivation. Reunification of this family in their 
country of origin, Eritrea, is not a feasible possibility.160
Both the waiting times and protracted procedures have a particularly adverse 
impact on unaccompanied minors. They mean that often applicants will “age out” 
of the protective provisions for unaccompanied minors before they have the legal 
or practical opportunity to apply for family reunification.161 If that occurs, the legal 
implications are severe. Normally, adult refugees can only exceptionally reunify 
with their parents, if they can prove the dependency of the parent on the child. 
This is unlikely to be established where a refugee flees in childhood, and has had a 
protracted flight or period waiting as an asylum seeker.
 Unaccompanied minors are adversely affected 
by waiting times and protracted procedures.
In the Netherlands, the law requires that a minor be under 18, not when the applica-
tion for family reunification is made, but rather when the decision on that application 
is given. The compatibility of this requirement with EU law is currently before the 
CJEU.162 In Finland, the position of unaccompanied minor sponsors became more 
difficult in 2010, when the law was changed to this effect also, so that a minor had 
to be under 18 when the decision was given. Family reunification proceedings being 
very long, many young sponsors reach the age of 18 years during the proceedings. 
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The maximum allowed length established by the Aliens Act for the decision-making 
process in family reunification cases is nine months. If this is exceeded and the delay 
is not caused by the applicant, the decision can still be positive even if the sponsor 
has reached 18 years of age. In 2014, the average processing time was 414 days in 
cases where the sponsor was a minor beneficiary of international protection and the 
applicant was his or her parent. At the moment the decision can usually be made in 
the required nine months.
5.2. Family members eligible for reunification
The realities of life in many refugees’ regions of origin mean that family units may 
not be nuclear families based on a formal marriage. Flight and protracted exile also 
impact on family units and structures. UNHCR’s ExCom Conclusion No. 24 notes in 
this respect that: “It is hoped that countries of asylum will apply liberal criteria in 
identifying those family members who can be admitted with a view to promoting 
a comprehensive reunification of the family”.163 It is also noted that PACE, through 
Recommendation 1686 (2004) on human mobility and the right to family reunion, 
has urged European states: 
 to apply, where possible and appropriate, a broad interpretation of the concept of family 
and include in particular in that definition members of the natural family, non-married 
partners, including same-sex partners, children born out of wedlock, children in joint 
custody, dependent adult children and dependent parents.164
5.2.1. Spouses and partners
Some states have provisions for family reunification for stable partners, even if not mar-
ried. However, the types of evidence needed to demonstrate the stability of a partnership 
vary greatly, and some states only accept formalised civil partnerships. In Ireland, new 
legislation165 defines immediate family members as the spouse, civil partner, minor 
children, or parents and siblings if the sponsor is an unmarried minor. The inclusion 
of civil partners is noteworthy, but unlikely to enable reunion of same-sex couples, 
given that most refugees flee states where this status is not legally available, although 
domestic case law recognises common-law marriages.166 In Pajić v. Croatia, the Court 
found a violation of Article 14 in connection with Article 8 of the Convention in the 
fact that family reunification rules in Croatia permitted no applications from same-sex 
couples.167 By the time the case came to Court, the domestic law had been reformed.
 Raising age requirements is another 
obstacle to family reunification. 
Some states have introduced age requirements to raise the age at which migrants 
in general may benefit from family reunification, with the age of 21 being set as the 
maximum in the FRD.168 Five EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Lithuania 
and the Netherlands) have set the age limit at 21. Denmark is not bound by the FRD 
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and has set an even higher age limit of 24 for some time. In contrast, the UK Supreme 
Court held that a similar requirement imposed in the UK breached Article 8 of the 
Convention, as it was found disproportionate to the stated aim of combating forced 
marriage.169 This suggests that such age limits must be justified and, in refugee cases, 
where they could amount to a long waiting time in dangerous circumstances, their 
justification is likely to be more difficult.
5.2.2. Children
Most states permit reunification with minor children, including adopted children. 
However, some states require formal proof of adoption, which may be difficult to 
procure. Another legal difficulty concerns children of one spouse or partner. Member 
states may demand proof that the other spouse or partner agrees to the reunification. 
This proof may also be difficult for refugees to procure. Further evidential barriers to 
proving parent-child relationships are considered in section 5.3.3. below. In general, 
family reunification of adult children is not permitted, unless there is some particular 
need. To illustrate, Article 4, paragraph 2.b, of the FRD refers to discretion to admit 
“the adult unmarried children of the sponsor or his or her spouse, where they are 
objectively unable to provide for their own needs on account of their state of health”.
In the UK, the definition of  “child” adds additional criteria beyond minority – in 
addition the child must be “not leading an independent life” and must have been 
“part of the family unit of the refugee or person with humanitarian protection (i.e. 
a subsidiary protection beneficiary) at the time when the refugee fled”.170 At one 
point, this latter requirement was interpreted to mean that children born post-flight 
(even if conceived pre-flight) were not eligible for reunion, but the practice on this 
matter has changed.
5.2.3.  Extended family members and the question of their dependency
Most national legislation only includes immediate family members in the entitle-
ment to family reunion. Some European states have discretionary processes for 
extended family members, provided they are dependent on the sponsor, following 
the structure of the FRD. A recent report concluded that “[c]riteria for determining 
dependence vary widely across Europe, creating a lottery for applicants who seek 
to be reunified with their family (beyond the nuclear family)”.171
Until recently, Spain did not require dependency to be proven for relatives in the ascend-
ing line, but that requirement has been recently introduced. In practice it appears that 
dependency is construed as financial dependency as demonstrated through regular 
financial contributions. It appears that this requirement is difficult to prove for those 
whose relatives still live in conflict zones where access to financial services may be 
impeded. In Hungary, dependency is interpreted solely as financial dependency. In 
practice, the application is rejected if the refugee is found not to be able to maintain 
his or her parent in Hungary, even if the claim was submitted during the preferential 
period for refugee family reunification of three months after the recognition.
In Ireland, new legislation in force since December 2016 appears to end the dis-
cretion to admit extended family members.172 The previous legislation required 
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demonstration of dependency or demonstration that the family member was “suf-
fering from a mental or physical disability to such an extent that it is not reasonable 
for him or her to maintain himself or herself fully”.173 It is anticipated that this change 
is likely to split up families – for example by requiring parents reuniting with minors 
to leave adult children or elderly relatives behind. One NGO with long experience in 
assisting refugee family reunification predicts “the new family reunification provi-
sions will devastate families”.174
 Adult children, siblings and elderly relatives 
often cannot benefit from family reunification.
As is discussed below, there is good practice and persuasive guidance on the inter-
pretation of “dependency”, from both UNHCR175 and the European Commission as 
regards the FRD.176 In EU law, the Commission notes that the CJEU has held that the 
status of “dependent” family member is the result of a factual situation characterised 
by the sponsor’s provision of legal, financial, emotional or material support for that 
family member, or by the sponsor’s spouse/partner.177
This guidance should be used to promulgate formal guidelines on the concept of 
dependency. The concept should allow for a flexible assessment of the emotional, 
social, financial and other ties and supports between refugees and family members. 
If those ties have been disrupted due to factors related to flight, this should not be 
taken to signal that dependency has ceased.
5.2.4. Distinctions between pre- and post-flight families
Many European states limit refugees’ privileged access to family reunification to the 
so-called “pre-flight family”, relying on Article 9, paragraph 2, of the FRD. However, 
distinctions between pre- and post-flight families warrant scrutiny from a human 
rights perspective, and may breach Article 14 taken together with Article 8 of the 
Convention.178 Some states use this exception in a rigid manner, requiring families 
to be formed in the country of origin of the refugee. However, this ignores the reality 
that many refugees may have spent long periods in exile or in flight, and have formed 
families outside the country of origin. Moreover, a family formed in the country of 
asylum is still a family under human rights law. While this does not mean that all 
families formed there must be permitted to stay together, in the case of relation-
ships where the couple has no other way to enjoy family life, that is nevertheless 
the implication of the human right to respect for family life.179
 A family formed after fleeing the country of 
origin is still a family under human rights law.
The UK rules on family reunification contain a similar distinction between pre- and 
post-flight families. The definitions of both categories are complex. Their effect is that 
many refugee families are excluded from the more favourable conditions applicable 
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to pre-flight families. Post-flight families are subject to all the normal immigration 
rules on family reunion, including high financial thresholds and language tests. 
Similarly in Norway, all refugees are currently entitled to family reunification under 
the same conditions.180 However, Norwegian law contains the pre- and post-flight 
distinction, thus subjecting post-flight couples to the ordinary family reunification 
rules, which are extremely demanding.181
5.3. Legal and practical barriers to refugee family reunification
5.3.1. Long waiting times
As mentioned above, when Germany limited the rights of subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries to family reunification, it chose to use a two-year waiting period. As 
regards 1951 Convention refugees, the FRD generally only allows a two-year waiting 
period for migrants, but explicitly envisages that 1951 Convention refugees who 
apply for family reunification should be exempted from it.
Significant waiting periods apply to subsidiary protection beneficiaries in Austria 
(3  years), the Czech Republic (15 months), Denmark (3 years), and Switzerland (3 years).
Austria’s long waiting period of three years for subsidiary protection beneficiaries 
was introduced in June 2016.182 In Denmark in early 2015, the national legislation 
was amended to introduce a new category of “temporary protection status”, along 
with 1951 Convention refugee and subsidiary protection status.183 The new status 
is designed for those who, due to a situation of generalised violence, are at risk 
of ill-treatment contrary to the Convention, the ICCPR and/or the UN Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
It is assumed that such persons’ protection need is of a more temporary nature 
than that of 1951 Convention refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries. 
As of February 2016, only 1951 Convention refugees and subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries are entitled to apply for family reunification when they are granted 
protection in Denmark. Sponsors holding temporary protection status are subjected 
to a three-year waiting period.
 Long processing and waiting times hinder the effective 
realisation of the right of refugees to family reunification.
As well as these formal waiting periods, some states generate waiting times infor-
mally, with similar restrictive effects. New legislation in force since December 2016 
in Ireland introduces a one-year waiting period after status has been recognised 
before family reunification may be sought.184 This is particularly worrying since 
status determination is often protracted in Ireland, and sometimes takes years. 
The Netherlands does not differentiate between 1951 Convention refugees and 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries. It maintains a single asylum status. In February 
and May 2016, the government informed asylum seekers that family reunification 
could take as long as two years, since the asylum procedure could last 18 months, 
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the maximum allowed by the EU Asylum Procedure Directive,185 and the applica-
tion for family reunification would take yet another six months. Both letters were 
widely publicised and posted on social media by the government.186 In effect, this 
was understood to establish an equivalent practice to the newly introduced German 
two-year waiting period.
In Switzerland similarly, those refugees with so-called “Status F”, a form of temporary 
status for those who are not 1951 Convention refugees, are subjected to a waiting 
period of three years from recognition to reunification. Family reunification of such 
sponsors depends on the availability of suitable housing and proof that the family is 
not dependent on social assistance. Many applicants in Switzerland are granted this 
temporary status (in 2016, more people were granted this status than recognised as 
1951 Convention refugees).187 In practice, being granted this status makes finding 
employment more difficult, thereby making it more difficult to meet the material 
conditions for reunification as regards financial independence and suitable accom-
modation. The accommodation requirement is interpreted strictly, such that one 
bedroom is required for each child, and the accommodation must be secured at 
the time the application is made.
5.3.2. Short deadlines
Many states impose tight deadlines for family reunification applications, requiring 
applicants to submit applications within three months of being recognised if they 
wish to benefit from the more liberal rules for refugees. For many refugees, meeting 
this deadline is impossible. There may be difficulty tracing family members, gather-
ing the requisite documentation and arranging for family members to travel to the 
relevant consulates or embassies.
 For many refugees, meeting tight deadlines to 
apply for family reunification is impossible.
In 2012, UNHCR noted that most states did not make use of the facility in the FRD 
to limit refugees’ preferential access to family reunification using this three-month 
time limit.188 This facility was included in the FRD at the behest of the Netherlands, 
which had such a provision in its domestic law. Notably, at present a proposal is under 
discussion there to extend the time limit for the application for family reunification 
from three to six months.189 At the time, UNHCR welcomed this approach:
 in recognition of the specific circumstances of refugees, and call[ed] on all Member States 
not to apply such time limits to the more favourable conditions granted to refugees. As a 
minimum, time limits should only apply for the introduction of an application for family 
reunification and should not require that the applicant and family member provide all 
the documents needed within the three month period.190
Since 2012, an increasing number of states apply the short time limit of three 
months. This is the case in Germany, for example. However, some practical measures 
have been adopted to enable sponsors to apply within the three-month period. In 
order to ensure that the three-month requirement is formally kept to, applicants 
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are encouraged to register on a specified webpage within the three-month period, 
while waiting for their embassy appointment.191
In Luxembourg, refugees are entitled to family reunification on the more favourable 
conditions only if an application is filed within three months of recognition (even if 
they cannot locate their family members). After this point in time, they must fulfil the 
demanding conditions relating to health insurance, housing and stable resources.192 
In Sweden too, 1951 Convention refugees must apply within three months if they 
wish to avoid onerous maintenance requirements (which entail strict income and 
accommodation requirements). Hungary is also an example of this approach. It has 
a preferential system for family reunification for 1951 Convention refugees, but it is 
often practically impossible for them to access it.193 The preferential rules only apply 
to 1951 Convention refugees who apply within three months of being informed of 
recognition (this is the case since 1 July 2016 – previously it was six months), and do 
not apply to subsidiary protection beneficiaries. Outside the preferential system, the 
requirements relate to financial resources, accommodation, health insurance and 
funds for family members’ return travel.
In Norway, families must apply for family reunification within one year after the 
sponsor was granted a residence permit. If they fail to do so, they become subject 
to the stringent general immigration requirements.
5.3.3. Onerous evidential requirements
Refugees often face particular difficulties in providing official documentation to 
substantiate their family relationships. Article 11, paragraph 2, of the FRD obliges 
member states to take into account other evidence when the refugee cannot provide 
official documentary evidence, and provides that, “[a] decision rejecting an application 
may not be based solely on the fact that documentary evidence is lacking”. UNHCR’s 
ExCom Conclusion No. 24 calls for facilitated entry on the basis of liberal criteria of 
family members of persons recognised to be in need of international protection, 
and in particular underlines that, “the absence of documentary proof of the formal 
validity of a marriage or of the filiation of children should not per se be considered 
as an impediment”. The same position is contained in paragraph 4 of the Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (99) 23 on family reunion 
for refugees and other persons in need of international protection.
 Providing official documentation to show family 
relations is often particularly problematic for refugees.
However, empirical studies demonstrate that, all too often, applications are refused 
for lack of documentation, without providing the opportunity to submit alternative 
evidence. In the UK, studies demonstrate that significant practical barriers to family 
reunification emerge due to the high standards of proof required by the UK authorities 
to demonstrate family links. In 2015, the British Red Cross published a report based 
on 91 family reunion cases, which found that family reunion applications are not 
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straightforward and that vulnerable family members are left in danger as a result of 
difficulties accessing family reunification.194 A recent official inquiry substantiated 
complaints that procedures were too onerous and rejections too frequent.195 The 
report found that the Home Office was too ready to refuse applications on the basis of 
failure to provide sufficient evidence, and failed to defer decisions to allow applicants 
to produce the “missing” evidence. A particular problem was noted in relation to the 
provision of DNA evidence. In 2014, the Home Office withdrew funding support for 
DNA testing, leading to a significant increase in refusals.
Moreover, for single-parent families, some states demand proof of parental authority 
or the death of the other parent. Both can be impossible to provide if one parent 
remains in a conflict zone. For non-biological children, there are particular challenges 
because in many refugees’ states of origin, adoption is not a formal process.
States increasingly demand DNA proof of parent-child relationships for refugees. The 
costs of DNA tests are often prohibitively high. As mentioned above, when the UK 
withdrew financial support for DNA tests, many applicants were unable to provide 
this evidence themselves and the rate of rejected applications increased.
DNA testing raises a number of ethical and human rights issues. As a recent scholarly 
study noted:
 It reduces the socio-biological complexity of the family to a solely biological entity and 
has the potential to exclude family members that are only related socially and not geneti-
cally. Subsequently, it establishes a double standard for family recognition between EU 
citizens and immigrants. Parental testing may also show that family members are not 
biologically related and therefore pose ethical questions. Additionally, it can be used as 
another means of reducing legal immigration.196
UNHCR urges that:
 DNA testing to verify family relationships may be resorted to only where serious doubts 
remain after all other types of proof have been examined, or, where there are strong 
indications of fraudulent intent and DNA testing is considered as the only reliable recourse 
to prove or disprove fraud.197
In terms of good practice, problems with documentary proof can be reduced by 
accepting standard documents issued by official authorities rather than copies of 
the original birth or marriage certificates. For example, the German government 
in May 2015 decided that credible evidence (qualifizierte Glaubhaftmachung) of a 
family relationship was sufficient rather than full documentary proof and dropped 
the requirement of original civil registration documents and legalisation of these 
documents where an excerpt from the official Syrian family register is presented.198
5.3.4. Financial cost barriers
Family reunification also emerges as a financially costly process, in particular when 
formal visa and embassy fees, translation costs, verification of documents, travel costs 
to distant embassies and DNA tests are taken into account.199 For this reason, UNHCR 
urges fee waivers and financial support to enable refugee family reunification.200
As regards formal fees, for instance, in Norway, adult applicants must all pay a 500 euros 
application fee. More generally, the accumulated costs of fees, travel, translation of 
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documents and other formalities are several thousand euros for a family. Similar 
costs are estimated in Belgium.201
The cost of documentation accompanying the application for family reunification can 
be reduced by reducing the number of documents required to the essential ones, by 
waiving legalisation of documents and accepting English translations of standard 
documents (marriage books and birth certificates). If official travel documents are 
not available, other documents should be accepted.
As to the costs for the family members to travel to the sponsor’s country of refuge, dif-
ferent solutions are possible. The Danish government used to fund transport of family 
members being reunited with refugees living in Denmark. However, that funding was 
abolished as one of a series of recent restrictive measures.202 In the Netherlands, an 
NGO (VluchtelingenWerk Nederland) pays travel costs of families unable to pay for 
the tickets themselves from a special fund fed by private donations and a national 
lottery. In Belgium, an NGO, Un Visa, Une Vie (One Visa, One Life) crowdfunds visa 
applications to enable Syrian refugees’ families to join them in Belgium.
5.3.5.  Challenges in refugees’ country or region of origin hindering 
family reunification
The country of origin of refugees is usually mired in conflict, instability and/or has a 
repressive government. This fact inevitably poses challenges for family reunification, 
in particular if new or reissued documentation is required from the state of origin. 
Demanding such documentation can also pose risks for refugees, by making their 
governments aware of their activities and place of residence, or their families’ plans 
to flee. Some European states do not accept identity and marriage documentation 
from refugees’ countries of origin, particularly if they are viewed as weak states such 
as Somalia or Afghanistan, considering the documentation to be unreliable. In these 
cases, the fairness of procedures depends on the authority’s flexibility in accepting 
alternative forms of proof of the family relationship.
 Obtaining travel documents is often a challenge  
for family members, even once the 
family reunification is granted.
A second set of practical barriers emerge because of family members’ limited 
access to embassies and consulates. Previous studies have documented practices 
that physically preclude access to embassies to pick up visas, and long delays that 
effectively bar refugees’ families from benefiting from the preferential treatment to 
which they would otherwise be entitled.203 When embassies in countries of origin 
are closed (as is often the case), European states nowadays tend to require family 
members to travel to embassies elsewhere in person. Often the embassies that 
accept applications are not the most obvious ones. For example, Norway requires 
family members to travel to the following consulates – Khartoum for Eritreans, Addis 
Ababa for Somalis, Islamabad for Afghans.
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As regards the UK, while applications from family members outside the UK are gener-
ally made online, fingerprints and a photograph (known as “biometric information”) 
must be submitted at a visa application centre. Difficulties arise because refugees’ 
family members are often in countries without such a visa facility, in which case 
the applicant needs to visit the relevant visa application centre in another coun-
try. Applicants from Syria must go to Lebanon or Jordan, but are not directed to 
Turkey, for example. In contrast, Germany introduced the possibility to make online 
appointments for visa applications in many of its consulates in the Middle East in 
2015. The main interviews are still in person, but at least the booking system means 
that multiple trips do not have to be made.
Many of these barriers could be reduced with greater co-operation between European 
states. In particular, EU member states could consider using forms of co-operation 
provided for in Articles 40 and 41 of the EU Visa Code to deal jointly with visa applica-
tions where a member state still has consular services, or opening a new common 
visa office in or near to the countries of origin of many refugees.
Beyond the state of origin, the realities of flight mean that refugee families are often 
separated, and refugees typically flee in the first instance to neighbouring countries, 
where their status is usually precarious. Hungary also imposes one particularly 
restrictive and anomalous rule. It is required that the family member submitting an 
application for family reunification must be “lawfully resident” in the country from 
which he or she applies.204 For family members who are themselves fleeing (as is 
often the case), this requirement may be impossible to fulfil. Furthermore, combined 
with the requirement that an application must be submitted through a Hungarian 
consulate, the “lawfully resident” rule may constitute an insurmountable obstacle. In 
some regions there are no consulates in every country and it is normally not feasible 
for family members to be “lawfully resident” in a country they are only temporarily 
visiting with a view to submitting their application.205 Hungarian practice is also 
rigid and restrictive in its approach to travel documents, proof of marriage and 
translation requirements.206
Even once family reunification applications have been granted, family members 
often face additional practical barriers as they still require a visa to travel. However, 
a regular visa requires a valid passport. There are well-established alternative forms 
of documentation (1954 Convention travel documents, emergency ICRC travel docu-
ments, national laissez-passers) that may be issued to facilitate travel, but it appears 
that many states do not make them available.207
The asylum system in Turkey is somewhat different, in that it distinguishes sharply 
depending on the nationality of the refugees in question. Most Syrian refugees as 
a group enjoy a particular form of the“temporary protection”. In law, those with this 
status are entitled to apply for family reunification with family members outside 
Turkey. The regulation’s language suggests that there is no right to family reunifica-
tion, but merely a right to request it.208 Family members are defined as spouse, minor 
children and dependent adult children.209 The regulation also provides that in the 
case of unaccompanied children, “family unification steps shall be initiated without 
delay without the need for the child to make a request”.210 A recent report suggests 
that this provision is not implemented in practice.211 Many non-Syrian refugees in 
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Turkey live in limbo and asylum procedures are difficult to access. For most, routes to 
regular status and the attendant family reunification they may seek, remain difficult 
or impossible to access.
5.4. Status of beneficiaries of family reunification
Once admitted to the country of asylum, UNHCR’s ExCom Conclusion No. 24 notes 
in this respect that: “[i]n order to promote the rapid integration of refugee families 
in the country of settlement, joining close family members should in principle be 
granted the same legal status and facilities as the head of the family who has been 
formally recognized as a refugee”. Similarly the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers advises member states to grant the family member a residence permit of 
the same duration as that held by the principal.212
 Family reunification processes should ensure 
gender equality and child protection.
Under many systems, spousal residence rights may lapse if the authorities discover 
that a married couple is no longer together. This practice raises particular concerns 
from gender equality and child protection perspectives, as it can create a risk fac-
tor for those experiencing or at risk of domestic violence. Some states mitigate that 
risk by providing autonomous migration statuses or allowing those who experi-
ence domestic violence to apply for independent status. Article 59 of the Istanbul 
Convention urges states to ensure that victims of domestic violence whose residence 
status depends on that of the spouse or partner, in the event of the dissolution of 
the marriage or the relationship, are granted (in the event of “particularly difficult 
circumstances”) an autonomous residence permit irrespective of the duration of 
the marriage or the relationship.213 Similarly, the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers recommends that family members should be granted an autonomous 
residence permit independent of the principal after four years of legal residence. In 
the case of divorce, separation or death, member states should allow applications for 
an autonomous residence permit when the family member has been residing legally 
in the country for more than one year.214 In the UK, refugee spouses were excluded 
from these protections, but a successful case was brought leading to a ruling that 
this exclusion discriminated against the spouses of refugees, both on grounds of 
their particular legal status and indirectly on grounds of gender.215
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Concluding observations
This issue paper has clarified that in the case of refugees, broadly understood, the 
right to respect for their family life requires swift and effective family reunification. 
Having been recognised as in need of international protection, refugees cannot be 
expected to make their home elsewhere, and ensuring swift family reunification is 
imperative to avoid prolonging their suffering and allowing them to rebuild their 
lives in their new homes. Without family reunification, family separation is often 
agony for refugees, in particular if their family members have been left behind in 
conflict zones, camps or are living precariously without means of subsistence, as is 
often the case.
 Family reunification for refugees is integral to their  
enjoyment of the human right to family life 
and their integration in host societies.
Both the European Convention on Human Rights and EU law recognise in general 
that refugees should be accorded a privileged access to family reunification. Article 8 
of the Convention will normally tilt the balance decisively in favour of family reunifi-
cation for refugees, as reunification in the country of origin is impossible (and should 
be ruled out ipso facto) and is highly unlikely to be possible in third countries. Of 
course, each restriction will have to be examined on its own merits. This should take 
into account any particular reasons offered by the respondent state in question to 
legitimise such a restriction. However, in general, there are strong reasons to conclude 
that many of the current restrictions violate Article 8 of the Convention. Under the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, states are obliged to treat applications 
“in a positive, humane and expeditious manner”. The principles underlying these 
international instruments also support a strong right to family reunification for 
refugees. Moreover, drawing arbitrary distinctions between different categories of 
refugees and other international protection beneficiaries will often violate Article 14 
of the Convention (read together with Article 8 of the Convention). The inequality 
of status between 1951 Convention refugees and subsidiary (and other protection) 
beneficiaries as regards the apparent coverage of EU family reunification law does 
not justify that difference in treatment.
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However, in practice, as the analysis in this issue paper reveals, refugees and, in par-
ticular, beneficiaries of subsidiary and other forms of protection cannot easily enjoy 
their right to family reunification. The personal scope of the apparently privileged 
access to family reunification is often limited, and only available to those refugees 
who apply promptly or who are willing to wait. Additional legal hurdles include 
onerous evidential requirements, financial cost barriers, and various challenges for 
family members in accessing embassies and consulates. Many of the restrictions 
identified were introduced as knee-jerk reactions to the refugee arrivals of 2015, 
when European governments regrettably seemed to reach for any measure that 
would potentially be seen to deter or stem arrivals. While there is no question about 
the challenge some Council of Europe member states are facing to accommodate 
newly arrived refugees, 2016 and 2017 have seen a sharp drop in the numbers 
arriving. For those refugees who will make Europe their home for the foreseeable 
future, swift family reunification is imperative to enable their integration and the 
effective protection of their families.
To conclude, family reunification, in particular for refugees, is integral to the effective 
enjoyment of the human right to respect for their family life and to their integration 
in host societies. Without family reunification, refugees often have little prospect of 
settling into new lives, even temporarily. Family reunification is also a key aspect of 
refugee protection – a well-ordered asylum system should, from the outset, give 
due diligence to questions of family life and the whereabouts of the family members 
of asylum seekers and refugees. The recommendations set out at the beginning of 
this paper are addressed to Council of Europe member states in order to make the 
right to family reunification practical and effective. The obligation is incumbent on 
all state and regional authorities to make this work. The European Union and its 
member states are urged to work together to ensure that asylum policies and law, 
including the Dublin Regulation, enable rather than undermine refugees’ right to 
family unity. Last but not least, the important role for civil society actors, who have 
both enabled legal challenges where legal processes are violating the right to family 
life, and in supporting refugees through the costly and complex bureaucracy of 
family reunification, should be highlighted.
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The Council of Europe is the continent’s leading 
human rights organisation. It comprises 47 member 
states, 28 of which are members of the European 
Union. All Council of Europe member states have 
signed up to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, a treaty designed to protect human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. The European Court 
of Human Rights oversees the implementation 
of the Convention in the member states.
For refugees, the right to family reunification is crucial because 
separation from their family members causes significant anxiety 
and is widely recognised as a barrier to successful integration in host 
countries. Well-designed family reunification policies also help create 
the safe and legal routes that are necessary to prevent dangerous, 
irregular journeys to and within Europe. 
Despite the importance of facilitating family reunification for both 
refugees and European states, the trend is now towards imposing 
greater restrictions in this area. This paper assesses restrictions on 
the right to family reunification, as enshrined in United Nations 
human rights treaties, the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and European Union law, and shows that many of the legal 
and practical restrictions currently in place raise concerns from a 
human rights perspective.
Based on this analysis, the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights sets out a number of recommendations to member 
states intended to assist national authorities in re-examining their 
laws, policies and practices in order to give full effect to the right to 
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